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Meaningless DNA: Moore’s Inadequate
Protection of Genetic Material
Natalie Alexander*
ABSTRACT
Moore v. Regents of the University of California represents
the seminal case regarding the protection of genetic material. In
this case, the California Supreme Court held that patients do not
retain property rights in their excised genetic material; instead,
informed consent laws serve as genetic material’s only protection. Many states have accepted the Moore court’s decision not
to extend property rights to genetic material, and most states
choose to protect genetic material through informed consent
alone.
Moore and informed consent do not adequately protect genetic material, creating unjust results in which “donors” of genetic material have little to no recourse against researchers that
may seek to exploit them. Moreover, the two most commonly
advanced solutions to this lack of protection for genetic material—privacy law and property law—are each often proposed exclusively of the other, allowing researchers to profit off of
discarded surgical materials to the detriment of patients. These
loopholes have led to two notable victims of genetic exploitation:
John Moore of the Moore case and Henrietta Lacks.
This Comment uses these two highly publicized victims of
genetic material exploitation to argue that Moore is an outdated
and erroneous decision. It then builds on previously advanced
arguments for a combined privacy-and-property law approach to
genetic material protection, advocating for a solution that more
appropriately addresses the complexities of genetic material. This
proposed approach ultimately entails an intersection between
privacy, property, and tort law in the area of technical battery,
which would preserve both patients’ rights and the sense of self
that accompanies genetic material.
* J.D. Candidate, Penn State Dickinson Law, 2023.
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INTRODUCTION
First-year law students will likely recognize this Comment’s
seminal case from their introductory property class.1 Moore v. Regents of the University of California2 demonstrates the concept that
property rights are defined by the government; property rights can
therefore be expanded or revoked as the government sees fit,
meaning they are far from absolute.3
While the case’s overarching principle does not seem particularly counterintuitive, the details of Moore do. The case unequivocally states that property rights are not inherent to one’s own body
and genetic material.4 The background of the case can be equally as
shocking: a man with cancer, his body exploited by those bound to
help him, finds no recourse for the hundreds of thousands of dollars
earned through his stolen cells.5
While jarring, the facts of the Moore case are merely a refrain
of genetic research. Henrietta Lacks, the unwitting donor of the
first immortal cell line, was the victim of a similar exploitation.6 Her
story largely mirrors Moore: a woman with an aggressive cancer
seeks help from a medical center, only to have her cells stolen from
a biopsy meant to aid in her diagnosis and recovery.7 Researchers
1. See, e.g., JOHN G. SPRANKLING & RAYMOND R. COLETTA, PROPERTY: A
CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 37–46 (4th ed. 2018).
2. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
3. See SPRANKLING & COLETTA, supra note 1, at 26.
4. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d at 497.
5. Id. at 481–82, 497 (noting that, prior to Moore’s cancer treatment, researchers developed plans to profit from Moore’s cells without his consent, as well as
misrepresented several invasive medical procedures to procure additional samples
as necessary to cure his condition).
6. Sarah Zielinski, Henrietta Lacks’ ‘Immortal’ Cells, SMITHSONIAN MAG.
(Jan. 22, 2010), https://bit.ly/3jNjdVf [https://perma.cc/F8HF-NHXV] (explaining
that immortal cells “can grow indefinitely [and] be frozen for decades,” whereas
typical cells eventually die in culture).
7. Id.
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continue to use the resulting cell line to this day, over 70 years later,
and the first legal cases aimed toward recovering its millions of dollars in profits have only just begun.8
Unjust results such as those of Henrietta Lacks and John
Moore necessarily raise a number of questions: Was the Moore
court’s decision correct? Should we still follow it? Perhaps most importantly, what do the appropriate protections for genetic material
look like?9
This Comment argues that Moore v. Regents of the University
of California represents an erroneous and outdated decision that
requires a reexamination in the modern age of genetic research.
Furthermore, the Moore court’s unilateral approach to the protection of genetic material—through informed consent alone10 rather
than a multifaceted solution—is inadequate to address the complexity of genetic material and the additional complications that the
corresponding research entails. To prevent the exploitation of future patients, lawmaking bodies should not protect genetic material
using one area of law to the exclusion of all others. Rather, courts
and legislatures should take a combined approach to the protection
of genetic material, involving privacy, property, and tort law in a
manner that both corrects the mistakes of the Moore court and expands on its contributions.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Moore v. Regents of the University of California
In 1976, John Moore, a California resident, discovered he had
developed a type of cancer known as hairy-cell leukemia.11 After
seeking treatment at UCLA Medical Center, Moore learned that
his spleen, affected by the cancer, was near bursting.12 His doctors
recommended its removal to prevent potentially lethal conse8. Id.; Carl Zimmer, A Family Consents to a Medical Gift, 62 Years Later,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2013), https://nyti.ms/3CvbZfz [https://perma.cc/P6D4-74CL];
Taylor Romine, Estate of Henrietta Lacks Sues Biotechnical Company for Nonconsensual Use of Her Cells, CNN (Oct. 5, 2021, 1:03 AM), https://cnn.it/3Bk6Oyh
[https://perma.cc/9Q5C-KARV].
9. See, e.g., Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L.
REV. 359, 363–64 (describing “the law of the body” as “currently in a state of
confusion and chaos” in fluctuating between property, quasi-property, and privacy
approaches).
10. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d at 484–85, 497.
11. Id. at 480–81.
12. Dennis McLellan, John Moore, 56; Sued to Share Profits From His Cells,
L.A. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2001, 12:00 AM), https://lat.ms/3E5qW8R [https://perma.cc/
BD9G-H6A3].
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quences.13 On October 20, 1976, doctors at the medical center completed the splenectomy.14 Shortly after the removal of his spleen,
Moore’s leukemia miraculously went into remission.15
Moore’s association with his doctors should have ended with
his recovery from his cancer. However, prior to Moore’s splenectomy, researchers at the medical center arranged to receive samples
of the excised spleen.16 Moore signed a consent form before undergoing surgery, which stated that the medical center could “dispose
of any severed tissue or member by cremation.”17 The form contained no provisions advising him of the researchers’ intentions.18
As a result, Moore did not discover the researchers’ use of his tissues until after they subjected him to numerous additional and invasive sample collections under the guise of follow-up treatments.19
By the time Moore discovered the medical center’s research
and use of his tissues in 1984, several of its researchers had already
isolated and patented a cell line derived from his excised spleen.20
The cell line, called “Mo” after the first two letters of its “donor’s”
name, contained unique blood cells that strengthened immune system defenses against infection.21 The researchers eventually
reached a deal to commercialize the cell line at a profit of over
$400,000 for themselves and UCLA Medical Center.22 Moore did
not receive a share, which prompted him to sue the Regents of the
University of California and the individual researchers.23 Notably,
the lawsuit included a claim of conversion, which would require a
finding of property rights in one’s own body to succeed.24
13. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d at 481.
14. Id.
15. McLellan, supra note 12.
16. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d at 481.
17. REBECCA SKLOOT, THE IMMORTAL LIFE OF HENRIETTA LACKS 199
(2010).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 200; Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d at 481.
20. McLellan, supra note 12.
21. Id.
22. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d at 482.
23. McLellan, supra note 12.
24. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d at 482 n.4 (listing additional claims of lack of informed consent, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud and deceit, unjust enrichment, quasi-contract, “bad faith breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing,” intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent misrepresentation, “intentional interference with prospective advantageous
economic relationships,” slander of title, accounting, and declaratory relief). To
successfully argue conversion, Moore needed to prove the following elements: “(1)
[his] ownership or right to possession of the [cells] at the time of the conversion;
(2) defendants’ conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of [Moore’s] property
rights; and (3) damages.” Messerall v. Fulwider, 245 Cal. Rptr. 548, 550 (Cal. Ct.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\127-1\DIK109.txt

2022]

unknown

MEANINGLESS DNA

Seq: 5

25-OCT-22

11:23

343

At the trial court level, each defendant motioned to dismiss all
causes of action.25 After reviewing the motions, the trial court held
that Moore did not specifically allege that he did not know of the
researchers’ intentions, he did not specifically allege that the researchers knew of the tissue’s value at the time of its removal, and
he did not specify “whether he consented to the removal of his
spleen for therapeutic purposes.”26 Additionally, the court found
that Moore did not attach proof of his consent to the splenectomy
or any follow-up procedures, he failed to plead his claims of misrepresentation with specificity, and, most importantly, he had no cause
of action for his claim.27 The trial court therefore granted the motions.28 After an additional hearing, Moore declined to amend his
complaint, and the trial court subsequently dismissed his claim.29
Following the trial court’s dismissal of his claim, Moore appealed, arguing that the trial court should not have granted the defendants’ motions.30 After hearing Moore’s arguments, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Appellate District ruled in his favor, reversing the trial court’s initial dismissal of Moore’s complaint.31 Specifically, the Court of Appeals held that Moore’s cells were “something
over which the plaintiff enjoyed the unrestricted right [of] use, control, and disposition.”32 The court characterized any finding otherwise as “a massive invasion of human privacy and dignity,”
inexcusable even in the interest of medical progress.33
The California Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals.34 The court conceded that the researchers had a duty to disclose their intentions to Moore before his initial surgery so that he
could give informed consent.35 However, in reviewing Moore’s
claim of conversion, the court ruled that property rights did not exist in Moore’s cells at the time of their removal.36 In its justification,
the court effectively rejected the Court of Appeals’s opinion that
App. 1988) (quoting Baldwin v. Marina City Props., Inc., 145 Cal. Rptr. 406, 416
(Cal. Ct. App. 1978)).
25. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 501–02 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1988).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 502.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 515.
32. Id. at 505.
33. Id. at 508.
34. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 497 (Cal. 1990).
35. Id. at 483–85.
36. Id. at 488–89, 497.
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human dignity outweighed the interests of medical research.37 Instead, it claimed the threat of litigation by donors would cause researchers to become “reluctant to undertake research programs to
develop some pharmaceuticals that would prove beneficial . . . because of the fear of large adverse monetary judgments.”38 The court
also found that the creation of property rights in bodily tissues was
a task better left to the legislature and emphasized the lack of a
“pressing need” to create a rule of strict liability against
researchers.39
Perhaps most importantly, the court cited a hesitancy to define
donated genetic material as property while current law treated
“human biological materials as objects [sui generis].”40 In denying
Moore’s conversion claim, the court likened Moore’s attempts to
claim ownership of his cells to “forc[ing] the round pegs of ‘privacy’
and ‘dignity’ into the square hole of ‘property.’”41 Similarly, the
court worried that current statutes enacted in California “eliminate[d] so many of the rights ordinarily attached to property that
one cannot simply assume that what is left amounts to ‘property’ or
‘ownership’ [over cells] for purposes of conversion law.”42
The decision was not without disagreement; it passed by a 5-2
margin, accompanied by two dissenting opinions.43 Justice Broussard, although concurring with the court’s opinion that a patient
may not retain property rights in a body part after its removal, emphasized that UCLA Medical Center’s researchers developed an interest in Moore’s spleen prior to his surgery.44 In so doing, Justice
Broussard reprimanded the majority for focusing on an irrelevant
point and argued property rights should have been contemplated—
and found—in Moore’s spleen pre-removal.45 Furthermore, he rejected the court’s public policy argument, citing instead the likelihood that willing donors would continue to provide anatomical
37. Id. at 495–96.
38. Id. at 495 (quoting Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 479 (Cal.
1988)).
39. Id. at 496–97.
40. Id. at 489.
41. Id. at 491.
42. Id. at 491–92 (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7054.4 (Deering
1990)).
43. Id. at 498–523.
44. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d at 501–03 (Broussard, J.,
dissenting).
45. Id. (arguing that property rights necessarily exist in the human body
before excision, making the majority’s focus on the property status of the spleen
post-surgery misplaced).
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samples and highlighting researchers’ access to vast existing cell
repositories.46
Justice Mosk delivered a scathing dissent in which he condemned the majority for producing an “amateur biology lecture”
and ignoring the court’s duty to further the principles of common
law.47 Justice Mosk decried the majority’s opinion as baseless, resting solely on speculation and legal provisions that at best were only
loosely applicable.48 He referred to Moore’s lack of compensation,
despite being the source of the researchers’ lucrative cell line, as
“inequitable and immoral.”49 He also voiced a concern that the majority’s reliance on the requirement for informed consent would be
inadequate to protect future patients from similar exploitation.50
Although Moore was decided in the California state court system, rendering it merely persuasive precedent elsewhere, it is recognized as a landmark case.51 Numerous other jurisdictions
throughout the United States have adopted its ruling, often to the
detriment of patients similar to John Moore.52 Although Alaska’s
legislature has statutorily recognized property rights in one’s own
genetic material—thereby accepting the Moore court’s delegation
of what Justice Mosk sees as its common law responsibility—it remains the only state to have done so.53
John Moore did not receive the happy ending his initial surgery
seemed to foretell. In 1991, the Supreme Court denied Moore’s petition for certiorari.54 As a result, Moore was forced to accept the
California Supreme Court’s remand of his case, which was based on
its findings that the UCLA researchers breached their fiduciary
duty to seek Moore’s informed consent.55 On remand, Moore received what he termed a “token” settlement estimated to have to46. Id. at 504–05.
47. Id. at 521, 507–08 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 508–10.
49. Id. at 516.
50. Id. at 518–21.
51. See, e.g., J.E. Ferrell, Who Owns John Moore’s Spleen?, CHI. TRIB. (Feb.
18, 1990, 12:00 AM), https://bit.ly/3mnUGYP [https://perma.cc/8D93-AKUZ] (referring to Moore as a “landmark” case).
52. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Miami Child.’s Hosp. Rsch. Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp.
2d 1064, 1074–76 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (holding that ownership rights do not exist in
voluntarily donated genetic material, and donors therefore cannot dictate its use);
Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985, 995–98 (E.D. Mo. 2006) (holding
that tissue donations are inter vivos gifts, and donors therefore cannot request that
they be used only by particular researchers).
53. ALASKA STAT. § 18.13.010 (2021).
54. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 499 U.S. 936, 936 (1991).
55. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d at 497.
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taled between $200,000 and $600,000.56 This sum was largely aimed
at covering his legal fees.57 Moore spent much of the remainder of
his life fighting for recognition of patients’ property rights in their
own bodies.58 In 1996, Moore’s cancer returned, and on October 1,
2001, after undergoing experimental treatment in Seattle, Moore
passed away at the age of 56.59
B. Henrietta Lacks and the Continuing Need for Protection of
the Human Body
John Moore is not the only—or even the first—patient who
exemplifies the need for legal protection of the human body from
unauthorized research. In 1951, Henrietta Lacks, a young Black
woman from southern Virginia, visited Johns Hopkins Medical
Center to address her abnormal vaginal bleeding.60 Although Lacks
had been aware of strange pains for several months and over the
course of her last pregnancy, she did not address them immediately
due to concerns that “a doctor would take her womb.”61
Doctors at the medical center discovered Lacks had an aggressive cervical cancer, for which they performed a biopsy and began
radium treatments.62 Without consulting Lacks or her family, doctors retained a portion of the tissue retrieved during the biopsy.63
56. McLellan, supra note 12; SPRANKLING & COLETTA, supra note 1, at
48–49.
57. McLellan, supra note 12; SPRANKLING & COLETTA, supra note 1, at
48–49.
58. McLellan, supra note 12.
59. Id.
60. SKLOOT, supra note 17, at 18, 26 (noting that, though Lacks spent most of
her early life living in Clover, Virginia with her grandfather, she later moved to
Turner Station, a steel town near Baltimore, Maryland); The Legacy of Henrietta
Lacks, JOHNS HOPKINS MED. (Nov. 4, 2016), https://bit.ly/2ZwTyZE [https://
perma.cc/UU4Q-WQZS].
61. SKLOOT, supra note 17, at 14, 16; see also Alexandra Stern, Forced Sterilization Policies in the US Targeted Minorities and Those with Disabilities – and
Lasted into the 21st Century, THE CONVERSATION (Aug. 26, 2020, 8:20 AM), https:/
/bit.ly/3npPFyJ [https://perma.cc/S3SV-5FM5] (providing an overview of forced
sterilization, a longtime U.S. policy based on scientifically unsupported theories of
eugenics, which targeted Black women and other minority populations and may
have contributed to Lacks’s fears).
62. SKLOOT, supra note 17, at 27–28, 172, 213 (explaining that Lacks’s cancer
was originally misdiagnosed as an epidermoid carcinoma, then posthumously rediagnosed as a cervical adenocarcinoma caused by HPV infection); The Legacy of
Henrietta Lacks, supra note 60 (noting that radium therapies were the time period’s standard treatment for cervical cancers such as Lacks’s).
63. Ava-joye Burnett, Henrietta Lacks’ Family To Sue Pharmaceutical Companies Continuing To Use Her ‘HeLa’ Cells Without Their Permission, CBS BALT.
(July 29, 2021, 10:30 PM), https://cbsloc.al/3gGVmoN [https://perma.cc/24QKHWXK].
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George Gey, a researcher at the medical center, later discovered
the cells recovered from Lacks’s sample were “immortal,” meaning
they continue to grow and multiply outside the setting of a human
body.64 Lacks’s cells were the first known immortal cells, and Johns
Hopkins Medical Center researchers subsequently used them to
create a new series of cells known as the “HeLa” line.65
Lacks passed away on October 4, 1951, the same year she first
visited Johns Hopkins Medical Center.66 For over two decades afterwards, Lacks’s name was deliberately hidden from the public.67
Until the 1970s, scientists used fake names—including “Helen
Lane” and “Helen Larsen”—to explain the “HeLa” designation attached to the cell line.68 This policy was abandoned when, 25 years
after Lacks’s death, scientists contacted her descendants to inquire
about the possibility of obtaining similar cell samples.69 Through
this communication, Lacks’s family learned of the medical center’s
exploitation of her cells.70
Today, HeLa cells facilitate vaccines, fertility treatments, disease research, and even space travel.71 In 2013, the National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) and Lacks’s family came to an agreement
wherein members of the Lacks family will serve indefinitely as
members of a board tasked with approving access to recently sequenced HeLa genome data.72 The agreement marks a first-of-itskind solution to the Lacks family’s concerns surrounding the privacy of the HeLa genome and resulting research.73
However, the director of the Mayo Clinic has noted that such
advisory board positions are a “one-off solution,” not a uniform privacy protection measure.74 Furthermore, the agreement does not
compensate the family for Lacks’s unwitting medical contributions,
despite the family members’ repeated requests for the same.75 The
Lacks family has stated its intent to “[sue] pharmaceutical companies that continue to use Lacks’[s] cells without compensating the
64. SKLOOT, supra note 17, at 30, 40–41; Zielinski, supra note 6.
65. Zielinski, supra note 6.
66. SKLOOT, supra note 17, at 86; Romine, supra note 8.
67. Zielinski, supra note 6.
68. Id.
69. Id. (explaining that Lacks’s cells had contaminated other cultures through
airborne spread, and researchers sought to identify such instances of cross-contamination through comparison to descendants’ cells).
70. Id.
71. See Zimmer, supra note 8; Zielinski, supra note 6.
72. Zimmer, supra note 8.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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family.”76 The family recently filed the first of these lawsuits against
Thermo Fisher Scientific, Inc., claiming unjust enrichment based on
the company’s knowing use of Lacks’s unethically procured cells.77
The lawsuit requests that Thermo Fisher Scientific, which has sold
HeLa cells for over $2,000 per milliliter, “disgorge the full amount
of its net profits obtained by commercializing the HeLa cell line to
the Estate of Henrietta Lacks.”78 The lawsuit was filed at the U.S.
District Courthouse in Baltimore, Maryland, and currently, there is
no controlling precedent in the Fourth Circuit that signals how the
court will rule.79
The Lacks family’s current and potential future lawsuits portend lasting reforms for privacy and property rights in biological
material used for research purposes. The one-off nature of the family’s advisory board agreement with NIH raises concerns about the
future of genetic and biological privacy.80 The agreement primarily
highlights “a lack of policies to balance the benefits of studying genomes with the risks to the privacy of people whose genomes are
studied,” echoing Justice Mosk’s concerns in the Moore case about
the adequacy of informed consent as protection for potential donors.81 Furthermore, the lawsuit addresses property rights and the
undertones of race that surround the Henrietta Lacks story, expressly stating that “Black people have the right to control their
bodies. And yet Thermo Fisher Scientific treats Henrietta Lacks’[s]
living cells as chattel to be bought and sold.”82 While Johns Hopkins Medicine claims the 1951 exploitation of Lacks’s body “would
not happen today,” the family’s lawsuit cites ongoing modern concerns about a “racially unjust medical system.”83
Henrietta Lacks’s story also demonstrates that the exploitation
of patients’ bodies to procure unwilling donations is not limited to
the past. Lacks’s cells continue to live on in contemporary laborato76. Burnett, supra note 63.
77. Romine, supra note 8.
78. Michael Kunzelman, Henrietta Lacks Estate Sues Company Using Her
‘Stolen’ Cells, AP NEWS (Oct. 4, 2021), https://bit.ly/3Fw9fA0 [https://perma.cc/
GL8D-XDGC]; see also Laura Wadsten & Ellie Rose Mattoon, Henrietta Lacks’
Family Sues Thermo Fisher, JOHNS HOPKINS NEWS-LETTER (Oct. 11, 2021), https://
bit.ly/3qOCv10 [https://perma.cc/KKY9-XVRG].
79. Meredith Cohn & Hallie Miller, Family of Henrietta Lacks Files Suit
Against Biotech Company for Using Famous ‘HeLa’ Cells Without Permission,
BALT. SUN (Oct. 4, 2021, 8:53 PM), https://bit.ly/3qUWfAc [https://perma.cc/
2DYC-NZP3].
80. See Zimmer, supra note 8.
81. Id.
82. Romine, supra note 8.
83. Id.; The Legacy of Henrietta Lacks, supra note 60.
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ries and medical discoveries, perpetuating the HeLa researchers’
past wrongdoing.84 Additionally, the use of Lacks’s—or any other
donor’s—living cells without compensation or informed consent
presents ethical questions about whether such use constitutes enslavement of the human body.85 Without an adequate expansion of
rights to genetic and biological material, there is no guarantee that
what happened to Lacks and John Moore will not happen again to
others.
This Comment argues for such an expansion of rights to genetic and biological material. The following analysis begins by identifying the mistakes the Moore court made in holding that John
Moore could not bring a claim of conversion over his excised cells.
It then highlights the need for legislation to counteract the effects
of the decision, arguing specifically for an approach that combines
property, privacy, and tort law. Such an approach would facilitate
the creation of a new field of genetic information law, effectively
overcoming the Moore court’s inability to reconcile the exclusive
use of property law with the unique features of cells.86
II.

ANALYSIS

A. The Moore Court’s Mistakes
Moore remains the premier source of guidance regarding
claims of ownership over discarded tissue and genetic material, as
indicated by its consistent citation in rulings analyzing such claims.87
Thus, although the Moore court may have viewed its decision as
limited in application at the time of its ruling, the growing relevance
and development of genetic research reveal the consequences of
continued reliance on Moore and its increasingly obsolete reference
points.
84. Burnett, supra note 63.
85. See Kasim Kabbara, Henrietta Lacks Family Seeks Justice: Grandchildren
Sue Biotech Company, ABC NEWS (Oct. 14, 2021, 10:17 AM), https://abcn.ws/
3blvM5E [https://perma.cc/FAW6-5SPP] (quoting lawyer Benjamin Crump’s characterization of the cells as “chattel property . . . [which] reminisces of days of slavery when they sold [B]lack people as chattel property and we never got to [benefit]
from our labor, our contributions”).
86. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 489, 491–92 (Cal.
1990).
87. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Miami Child.’s Hosp. Rsch. Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp.
2d 1064, 1074–76 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (determining that ownership rights do not exist
in voluntarily donated genetic material, and donors therefore cannot dictate its
use); Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985, 995–98 (E.D. Mo. 2006) (holding that tissue donations are inter vivos gifts, and donors therefore cannot request
that they be used only by particular researchers).
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In determining the suitability of recognizing ownership rights
in excised tissue or genetic material, the Moore court first cited its
concern that “no court . . . [had] ever in a reported decision imposed conversion liability for the use of human cells in medical research.”88 Although the court conceded, somewhat appropriately,
that such a lack of precedent did not end its inquiry,89 even its partial reliance thereon was misplaced. At the time of the Moore
court’s ruling, genetic research was still in its infancy. The discovery
of the double-helical structure of DNA had taken place less than 40
years prior, and the first successfully synthesized gene was barely 20
years old.90 The court’s recognition of the novelty of John Moore’s
claim is therefore unsurprising, and in this light, its consideration of
the lack of precedent as a factor seems almost apathetic.91
The court, seemingly recognizing such a lack of precedent, held
that “the absence of [relevant] authority [could not] simply be attributed to recent developments in technology. The first human tumor cell line, which still is widely used in research, was isolated in
1951.”92 In light of the specific circumstances of Moore’s claim,
however, this statement falls flat. The court refers to the 1951 HeLa
line, which—as previously noted—multiplied automatically as a result of its inherent immortality.93 Such cell lines are rare, a fact that
the Moore court openly acknowledged.94 Conversely, at no point
did the court indicate that Moore’s cells were as readily equipped
for research; in fact, the court admitted that “cells taken directly
from the body . . . are not very useful for [the] purposes” intended
by the UCLA researchers.95 The UCLA researchers instead relied
on later-developed technologies, using recombinant DNA techniques to isolate portions of Moore’s cells.96 Prior to technological
advances allowing for such techniques, the low success rate of isolating cell lines would have been unlikely to produce precedential
88. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d at 487.
89. Id.
90. The Discovery of the Double Helix, 1951–1953, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. OF
MED., https://bit.ly/3FB2wVB [https://perma.cc/2BWC-QMHH] (last visited Mar.
3, 2022); Walter Sullivan, Complete Synthesis of Gene Reported, N.Y. TIMES (June
3, 1970), https://nyti.ms/3FEKkdA [https://perma.cc/RQG4-D2BS].
91. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d at 488.
92. Id. at 487 n.15.
93. Id.; see also Zielinski, supra note 6.
94. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d at 481 n.2 (noting that
“ ‘long-term growth of human cells and tissues is difficult, often an art,’ and the
probability of succeeding with any given cell sample is low, except for a few types
of cells not involved in this case”) (internal citation omitted).
95. Id.
96. Id.
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cases.97 Although the area of genetic research and the corresponding number of donations continue to grow, courts remain constrained by a single, admittedly outmoded decision.
The bulk of the ruling relied on other, more notable points.
The court primarily cited three concerns in its determination of
whether to extend conversion liability to the researchers’ actions:
“First, a fair balancing of the relevant policy considerations counsels against extending the tort. Second, problems in this area are
better suited to legislative resolution. Third, the tort of conversion
is not necessary to protect patients’ rights.”98
In assessing policy considerations, the court determined two to
be “of overriding importance”: “protection of a competent patient’s
right to make autonomous medical decisions” and the threat of dissuading research in the interest of medical advancement.99 To balance the public’s interest in each of these policies, the court placed
its faith in the statutory requirements of informed consent from patients.100 Doing so, however, exposed these statutes to Justice
Mosk’s concerns of whether informed consent requirements would
provide adequate protection for patients such as Moore.101 The
question remains: how can a “patient . . . prove a causal connection
between his or her injury and the physician’s failure to inform”
under the traditional negligence theories that govern informed consent?102 Moore did not learn of the UCLA researchers’ actions until after researchers patented the cell line and subjected him to
unnecessary “treatments.”103 Similarly, Henrietta Lacks’s family
did not discover the exploitation of her cells until years after her
death.104 These instances demonstrate that patients not in contact
with the scientific community may have little chance of discovering
researchers’ wrongful use of their cells.105 Furthermore, even if a
patient learns of such misconduct, they still face additional hur97. Id.
98. Id. at 493.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 494.
101. Id. at 518–21 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 519 (quoting Patricia A. Martin & Martin L. Lagod, Biotechnology
and the Commercial Use of Human Cells: Toward an Organic View of Life and
Technology, 5 SANTA CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 211, 222 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
103. Id. at 481 (majority opinion).
104. Zielinski, supra note 6.
105. See Madison Jennings, Protected Genetics: A Case for Property and Privacy Interests in One’s Own Genetic Material, 23 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10, 81 (2017)
(raising concerns over what may have occurred had the Lacks family not discovered the exploitation of Henrietta Lacks’s cells).
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dles.106 Justice Mosk noted that these hurdles involve proving that
not only would the patient have refused consent had they known of
the researchers’ intentions but that “no reasonably prudent person
would have given such consent.”107
Having addressed its stated first and third factors, the court
ended its analysis by holding that “if the scientific users of human
cells are to be held liable for failing to investigate the consensual
pedigree of their raw materials . . . the Legislature should make that
decision.”108 While the court was correct that “complex policy
choices affecting all society [were] involved” in ruling that the matter should be left to the legislature, the remainder of its decision in
the case indicated its open disdain for any consideration of biological materials as property.109 While the court may have left the proverbial door open for any legislation establishing property rights in
biological materials, it shut the door for the purposes of providing
any precedent in support thereof. Furthermore, in passing its decision off to the legislature, the court ignored that “the law of conversion is a creature of the common law.”110 The court therefore
rejected what Justice Mosk considered to be its immutable duty to
rule conclusively.111
Throughout the justification of its decision, the Moore court
relied on existing statutes to determine whether one retains ownership of their own cells.112 In leaving the ultimate decision of finding
property rights in cells to the legislature, the court held that “legislative competence to act in this area is demonstrated by the existing
statutes governing the use and disposition of human biological
materials.”113 Similarly, in determining whether property rights had
previously been found in cells, the court leaned heavily on the California Health and Safety Code, which it found stripped human biological materials of so many property rights as to render them
objects sui generis.114 These readings of California laws, however,
do not automatically remove biological materials from the realm of
property as the Moore court found.115 A government may grant or
106. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d at 519 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 496 (majority opinion).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 507 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 489, 491–92, 496 (majority opinion).
113. Id. at 496.
114. Id. at 489, 491–92.
115. Id. at 489, 491–92, 496.
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deny property rights as deemed necessary; such varying recognition
does not necessarily remove the designation of “property” from the
object.116 The court noted that “it may be that some limited right to
control the use of excised cells does survive the operation of [the
California Health and Safety Code].”117 However, its subsequent
abandonment of biological materials to the paltry protection of informed consent laws evaded the question of what these rights may
entail.118
As biological materials present many unique characteristics
that may indeed render them sui generis, the Moore court was not
entirely mistaken in analogizing Moore’s claims to “forc[ing] the
round pegs of ‘privacy’ and ‘dignity’ into the square hole of ‘property.’”119 Despite the potential aptness of this observation, the
court declined to define exactly how these “pegs” should apply to
objects that do not otherwise fit any set legal scheme.120 As will be
discussed in the following sections, a sufficiently comprehensive approach would not address privacy and dignity to the exclusion of
such areas as property and tort law. Instead, only a combined approach can provide protections tailored to the unique characteristics of biological materials.
B. Improved Protections: Where to Place the Pegs
Property law should not remain stagnant, especially in the face
of rapid medical and technological advancements.121 Thus, the constantly changing use of human cells should not continue without
adequate protection for the donors that provide them. The Moore
court determined that the “pegs” of privacy and dignity cannot fit
neatly enough into the “hole” of a simple property designation.122
The issue of the pegs stems not from a mistaken label, but from one
that does not adequately address the complexities of human biological materials. These complexities should be addressed by an intersection of at least three areas of law: property, privacy, and tort.
An intersectional approach to the protection of genetic material is not a novel proposition, and this Comment will not attempt
116. SPRANKLING & COLETTA, supra note 1, at 26.
117. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d at 492.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 491.
120. Id.
121. See SPRANKLING & COLETTA, supra note 1, at 27 (defining property law
as “a dynamic process”).
122. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d at 491.
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to reiterate past arguments.123 However, previously suggested approaches incorporate only privacy law and property law, which represent the two most commonly proposed solutions to the problem
of genetic material protection.124 Property law approaches typically
focus on the Moore court’s refusal to recognize patients’ ownership
rights in their genetic material, arguing as this Comment has that
the court should have found ownership rights and conversion liability.125 Privacy law approaches typically argue, as the Moore court
does, for informed consent protection of genetic material.126 Both
fields of law are undoubtedly essential to the protection of genetic
material: privacy law protects from unauthorized access to already
disseminated genetic material and information, while property law
protects from the dissemination of said material in the first place.127
Neither of these solutions alone addresses Justice Mosk’s concerns over the ability of an unwilling donor to argue a breach of
fiduciary duty.128 The two must therefore be combined to address
both fiduciary duty and the difficulties in proving its breach.129 Too
often, legal scholars consider these fields to be mutually exclusive,
when in reality, each addresses a different stage of the genetic material donation process.130 Past approaches to the combination of
the two fields have proposed property-and-privacy-law legislation
that would facilitate both the informed consent requirements relied
upon by Moore and the cause of action for conversion that the
Moore court mistakenly rejected.131
123. See generally Jennings, supra note 105 (arguing for the merits of a combined property-and-privacy law approach to the protection of genetic material).
124. Id. at 30–31 (noting that “[p]rotections of this kind are generally conceived under one of two already-existing legal frameworks: privacy or property”).
125. See id. at 27–30.
126. See id. at 30, 34–39.
127. Anya E.R. Prince, Comprehensive Protection of Genetic Information:
One Size Privacy or Property Models May Not Fit All, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 175, 187
(2013) (explaining privacy law as a means to protect genetic identity); Jennings,
supra note 105 at 69 (explaining property law as a means to “give individuals autonomy over their own genetic information and material”).
128. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 519 (Cal. 1990)
(Mosk, J., dissenting).
129. See id.
130. See Jennings, supra note 105, at 30 (“Scholarship on the matter [of genetic material protection] tends to pit these frameworks against one another, asking the question of whether a privacy right or a property interest best protects
individuals against the sort of infringement and violation suffered by Henrietta
Lacks.”)
131. See id. at 64–82, for further discussion of the merits of establishing property rights in genetic material, further discussion of the importance of maintaining
informed consent laws, and a proposed statute by which to combine the two types
of protection.
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However, even when combined, these two fields do not adequately address all facets of the unauthorized use of genetic material. Both privacy and property law envision genetic material as a
mere object to be manipulated, refusing to consider the true nature
of stealing from another’s body—namely, battery.132
Battery envisions one’s body as an extension of the self (the
“person” of another) rather than an object to which one can attach
rights.133 By combining property and privacy law protections of genetic material with battery, lawmaking bodies would provide further disincentive to physicians promulgating the unwilling
“donation” of genetic material to research. Equally as importantly,
the incorporation of battery into a comprehensive scheme of genetic material protections would avoid an exclusively commoditizing view of the human body, which was a principal concern
reflected by both the Moore court and the Lacks family lawsuit
against Thermo Fisher Scientific.134
Technical battery, which primarily addresses physicians’ offensive contact with a patient’s body, may provide an ideal grounds for
the expansion of genetic material protections into tort law.135 A
medical provider commits a technical battery when, “in the course
of treatment, [they exceed] the consent given by the patient.”136 Although in its current form, technical battery may be secondary to
informed consent laws regarding fiduciary duty and therefore re132. See, e.g., Jorge L. Contreras, Genetic Property, 105 GEO. L.J. 1, 35 (2016)
(viewing privacy law regarding the human body as enabling “property-like control” over genetic material); O’Brien v. Synnott, 72 A.3d 331, 335–36 (Vt. 2013)
(holding that a nurse was liable for battery where she performed a blood draw on
the plaintiff without seeking his express consent to the procedure’s purpose); Burchell v. Fac. Physicians & Surgeons of the Loma Linda Univ. Sch. of Med., 269 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 44, 54–55 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020) (holding that a surgeon was liable for
battery where he removed a mass that was larger than expected and spanned an
area that was not encompassed by the plaintiff’s consent).
133. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 (AM. L. INST. 1965) (defining battery as occurring when “an actor . . . acts intending to cause a harmful or
offensive contact with the person of the other . . . and [ ] an offensive contact with
the person of the other directly or indirectly results”).
134. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d at 497 (Arabian, J., concurring) (citing concerns that Moore “entreats [the court] to regard the human
vessel—the single most venerated and protected subject in any civilized society—
as equal with the basest commercial commodity”); Romine, supra note 8 (noting
the Lacks family lawsuit’s characterization of the use of living cells as “chattel to
be bought and sold”).
135. See Berkey v. Anderson, 1 Cal. App. 3d 790, 803 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969)
(raising technical battery as a possible cause of action in a medical malpractice
suit); Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1219 (10th Cir. 2003) (discussing
technical battery in the context of school medical providers performing examinations without consent).
136. Dubbs, 336 F.3d at 1219.
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dundant, it could be tailored to the protection of genetic
material.137
Legislatures should create specialized technical battery statutes
that specifically address the use of genetic material in research,
resolving many of the shortcomings of the Moore court’s reliance
on informed consent for surgery alone.138 Rather than limiting informed consent to the “course of treatment,” such specialized statutes should require additional and separate informed consent to
distribute genetic material and its resulting products.139 Thus, any
unauthorized use of a person’s genetic material would not only continue to treat the removed sample as the patient’s self but subject
unscrupulous researchers to tort liability as well.
Such specialized statutes would primarily prevent the use of
“lengthy, complex, and turgid” informed consent forms “that all but
the most sophisticated readers have difficulty understanding” to
bury agreements to unlimited research rights.140 The use of a second, separate form to agree to research use would highlight that
patients are agreeing to more than simply a surgery.
Moreover, these specialized technical battery statutes would
address many of Justice Mosk’s concerns over the high bar set by
proving breach of fiduciary duty, in that they would separate consent to the surgery from consent to research-based distributions of
the disputed genetic material.141 Patients would no longer be required, as Justice Mosk feared, to prove that “no reasonably prudent person would have given [informed] consent” to a surgery
while knowing of researchers’ intentions for their excised genetic
material.142 Instead, patients would be free to consent to surgery as
a reasonable person while denying consent to research-based distributions of their cells.143
Separate, informed consent has already been established in
many states, albeit for genetic testing and information rather than
137. See id.
138. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d at 519 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting) (reflecting concerns over whether informed consent alone would provide adequate protection to patients who are susceptible to exploitation).
139. Dubbs, 336 F.3d at 1219.
140. Contreras, supra note 132, at 29.
141. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d at 519 (Mosk, J., dissenting); see also Jameson v. Desta, 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d 755, 771 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013)
(stating that a physician’s fiduciary duty to disclose information material to a patient’s medical decisions relates to medical procedures).
142. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d at 519 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
143. See Jameson, 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 771.
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for genetic material specifically.144 New Hampshire in particular directs that “no person shall refuse to . . . do business with an individual, solely because the individual to be tested refuses to consent to
providing test results to some or all persons,” a provision that could
be extended under technical battery or supplementary statutes to
refusal to perform medical procedures.145 Additionally, Minnesota
provides that consent to disseminate genetic information remains
valid for only one year.146 Applied in technical battery or supplementary statutes, similar provisions may prevent the indefinite use
of genetic samples in a manner comparable to that of HeLa cells.147
Not every aspect of these statutes would be transferable to the
technical battery statutes this Comment proposes. Iowa’s statute,
for example, includes a provision exempting the retention of genetic information from informed consent if the retention is for research purposes and does not identify the donor.148 Similar
provisions would undermine the purpose of this Comment’s proposed technical battery statutes.
Some may also argue that the addition of tort law into a comprehensive scheme of genetic material protection law would be unnecessary, as privacy law features already adequately protect the
sense of self surrounding the human body.149 This argument declines to recognize the increasing similarities between developing
privacy law protections of genetic material (largely as a related result of protection of genetic information) and rejected applications
of property law to genetic material.150 Such an argument also de144. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-H:2(III) (LexisNexis 2021) (stating
that “no person shall disclose the results of [genetic] testing to any other person . . .
without the prior written and informed consent of the individual”); IOWA CODE
§ 729.6(3)(b) (2021) (stating that “a person shall not . . . collect, retain, transmit, or
use genetic information without the informed and written consent of the individual”); MINN. STAT. § 13.386(3)(a) (2021) (stating that “genetic information about
an individual . . . may be used only for purposes to which the individual has given
written informed consent”).
145. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-H:2(II) (LexisNexis 2021).
146. MINN. STAT. § 13.386(3)(a)(4)(ii) (2021).
147. See Zimmer, supra note 8; Zielinski, supra note 6 (citing ongoing modern
usage of HeLa cells).
148. IOWA CODE § 729.6(3)(c)(6) (2021) (providing that informed consent to
retention of genetic information does not apply “for the purposes of medical or
scientific research and education and for the use of medical repositories and registries so long as the information does not contain personally identifiable information of an individual”).
149. See, e.g., Rao, supra note 9, at 429–32 (arguing that “privacy conceives
the body as one with the person and bundles all privacy interests together in a
single individual”).
150. See Contreras, supra note 132, at 20–24 (comparing the concepts of the
rights to exclude and destroy, as reflected by genetic information privacy laws, to
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clines to address the aforementioned high bar set by burdens of
proof in breach of fiduciary duty cases, as raised by the Moore
dissent.151
Ultimately, the introduction of tort law to a comprehensive
scheme of genetic material protection law would simply provide a
much-needed extra layer of statutory protection. The current fragmented approach to the protection of genetic material attempts to
categorize genetic samples under one label or another at the expense of leaving loopholes for researchers to exploit. A combined
property, privacy, and tort law approach to the protection of genetic material would effectively avoid exploitative objectification of
the human body and provide additional avenues of recourse to unwilling donors of genetic material to research.
CONCLUSION
The landscape of statutory genetic protections is still growing
with that of genetic research. In October 2021, Florida enacted the
Protecting DNA Privacy Act to provide more concrete definitions
of genetic materials.152 Similarly, as of January 2022, California has
enacted the Genetic Information Privacy Act to provide improved
protection for genetic material and information.153
This growth need not be hindered by a single, outdated decision. Moore v. Regents of the University of California is a product of
a time when the full potential of genetic material had not been realized, creating a lack of precedent and a push towards genetic discovery with little regard for donors’ rights.
Nor does the growth of genetic protection need to be hindered
by insufficient protections. The Moore court’s attempts to force genetic material under one of two labels—property or privacy—fails
to recognize the true nature of genetic material.154 Genetic material
is both a tangible object and an extension of the self, an entity that
can only be recognized appropriately through an intersection of
property, privacy, and tort law. This approach is neither unfeasible
nor without merit. The use of all three areas of law would properly
those that would be reflected by property rights in genetic material); Jennings,
supra note 105, at 74 (recognizing that “a right to privacy is, at its core, a property
interest, and always has been”).
151. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 519 (Cal. 1990)
(Mosk, J., dissenting).
152. FLA. STAT. § 760.40 (2021); H.R. 833, 2021 Leg., 123d Reg. Sess. (Fla.
2021).
153. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 56.181–56.186 (Deering 2022); S. 41, 2021 Leg., 2021
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2021).
154. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d at 491.
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recognize the complex nature of genetic material while utilizing law
that is largely already in place. Above all, such an intersection of
law would provide contemporary and vulnerable patients with the
protections denied to them in the past, which could have prevented
the tragedies of John Moore and Henrietta Lacks.
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